Calvert Research and Management

GLOBAL PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES

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I. INTRODUCTION

Calvert Research and Management ("Calvert") believes that sound corporate governance and overall corporate sustainability and social responsibility are characteristics of healthy corporations. A well-governed sustainable and socially responsible company meets high standards of corporate ethics and operates in the best interests of all stakeholders (shareholders, employees, customers, communities and the environment). In our view, combining effective governance and corporate sustainability better positions a company to create long-term value.

Long-Term Value. Responsibly managed companies focus on long-term value creation that aligns the interests of management with those of shareholders and multiple other stakeholders. Effective governance is likely to be compromised when a company becomes myopic, focusing on current earnings expectations and other short-term goals rather than the fundamental soundness of the enterprise over the longer term. A focus on long-term value creation increases the relevance of companies’ environmental management, treatment of workers and communities, and other sustainability and social responsibility factors. Just as a short-term focus on earnings performance can compromise long-term shareholder interests, so can poor treatment of workers, communities, the environment or other stakeholders create short-term gain while increasing risks and compromising performance over the longer term. In voting proxies, Calvert seeks to support governance structures and policies that keep the focus of company management on long-term corporate health and sustainable financial, social and environmental performance.

Accountability. Management of a company must be accountable to the board of directors; the board must be accountable to the company’s shareholders; and the board of directors and management together must be accountable to the stakeholders. Accountable governance structures emphasize transparency, alignment of interests and inclusiveness: independent boards that represent a wide variety of interests and perspectives; full disclosure of company performance on financial, environmental, and social metrics; charters, bylaws, and policies and procedures to effectively communicate with management; and compensation structures that work to align the interests and time-frames of management and shareholders. Calvert’s proxy voting guidelines seek to support corporate structures that create and reinforce accountability, and oppose those that do not.

Sustainability. Well-governed companies are those whose operations are financially, socially and environmentally sustainable. Sustainability requires fair treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders in order to position the company for continued viability and growth over time. Effective corporate governance cannot indefinitely ignore or exploit certain groups or interests to the benefit of others without incurring material risks for the corporation. For example, companies that fail to account for potential liabilities associated with climate change may be creating risks that may result in costly government intervention or catastrophic losses. Calvert’s proxy voting guidelines aim to support sustainable governance that attends fairly to the interests of shareholders, workers, communities and the environment.

As a long-term investor, Calvert strives to encourage corporate responsibility, which includes respectful treatment of workers, suppliers, customers and communities, environmental stewardship, product integrity and high standards of corporate ethics as well as more traditional measures of sound corporate governance. Companies that combine effective governance and social responsibility seek to avoid unnecessary financial risk while serving the interests of both
shareholders and other stakeholders. In our view, Effective Governance + Sustainability and Social Responsibility = Corporate Responsibility.

On behalf of our clients, Calvert votes proxies in accordance with its Global Proxy Voting Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) that are in effect at the time of a vote. The Guidelines describe the general principles applied in determining the manner in which proxy proposals submitted to Calvert will be voted. With respect to certain types of proposals, the Guidelines indicate the manner in which Calvert ordinarily intends to vote such proposals. The Guidelines are primarily intended to address proxy proposals from operating companies. When voting on proposals relating to other types of entities (such as mutual funds, closed-end funds and business development companies), Calvert may take different or additional factors into consideration and will vote in a manner it deems to be in the best interest of its clients. The Guidelines are not meant to be exhaustive, nor can they anticipate every potential voting issue on which the shareholders may be asked to cast their proxies. There also may be instances when Calvert votes shares in a manner that does not strictly adhere to or is inconsistent with these Guidelines if doing so is deemed by Calvert to be in the best interests of shareholders. Calvert reviews the Guidelines periodically and they may be changed or updated at any time.

When support for or opposition to a proxy proposal as described below is qualified with the term, “ordinarily,” this means that Calvert generally foresees voting all shares as described except in special circumstances where Calvert determines that a contrary vote may be in the best interests of shareholders.

When Calvert’s intention to vote on a particular proxy proposal is “case by case,” this means that Calvert will determine the manner in which to vote based on the facts and circumstances applicable to the proposal.

The Guidelines do not attempt to address every possible proposal that may arise at a shareholder meeting. When voting proxies internationally, Calvert may consider local laws, customs and practices and update our policies as governance expectations evolve.
II. THE GUIDELINES

Set forth below are statements of the general principles that Calvert seeks to implement in voting proxies as well as the manner in which Calvert ordinarily expects to vote specific proxy proposals.

A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1. Board and Governance Issues

The board of directors (“the board”) is responsible for the overall governance of the corporation, including representing the interests of shareholders and overseeing the company’s relationships with other stakeholders. While company boards in most countries do not have a statutory responsibility to protect stakeholders, financial and reputational risks can result from inadequate attention to stakeholder interests. Thus, in our view, a board’s fiduciary duties to protect shareholder interests include maintaining appropriate relations with stakeholders.

**Board Independence**

One of the most fundamental sources of effective governance is independence. Directors who have financial or other affiliations with companies on whose boards they serve may face conflicts of interest between their own interests and those of the corporation’s shareholders and other stakeholders. In our view, the board should be composed of a majority of independent directors and key committees, including the audit, compensation, and nominating and/or governance committees (or committees with equivalent functions where not explicitly required), should be composed exclusively of independent directors.

Independent directors are those who do not have a material financial or personal relationship with the company or any of its managers that could compromise the director’s objectivity and fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. In general, this means that an independent director should have no affiliation with the company other than a seat on the board and (in some cases) ownership of sufficient company stock to give the director a stake in the company’s financial performance.

Because the board’s ability to represent shareholders independently of management can be compromised when the Chair is also a member of management, it is beneficial for the Chair of the board to be an independent director. Conflicts of interest may arise when one person holds both the chairman and CEO positions. Accordingly, effective board oversight may be enhanced by independent leadership. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **oppose** slates of directors without at least a majority of independent directors.
- **support** proposals requesting that the majority of directors be independent and that the board audit, compensation and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors.
- **oppose** non-independent directors when the company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee.
- **oppose** non-independent directors candidates nominated to the audit, compensation and/or nominating committees.
• **support** proposals seeking to separate the positions of Chair of the board and Chief Executive Officer as well as resolutions asking for the Chair to be an independent director unless the company has an effective counterbalancing governance structure to a combined chair/CEO, including a robust lead director role, and there are no other significant governance concerns.

**Board Diversity**

Well-governed companies benefit from a wide diversity of perspective and background on their boards. To bring such diversity to the board, directors should be chosen to reflect diversity of experience, perspective, expertise, gender, race, culture, age and geography. Calvert believes that in an increasingly complex global marketplace, the ability to draw on a wide range of viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, and experience is critical to a company's success. Corporate diversity helps companies increase the likelihood of making the right strategic and operational decisions, contributes to a more positive public image and reputation, and catalyzes efforts to recruit, retain, and promote the best people, including women and minorities.

Private companies may take some time to achieve an adequate balance of diversity and independence on their boards. Therefore, for private companies, Calvert will vote on case-by-case on board independence and board diversity matters, based on our evaluations of the board’s qualifications and appropriateness for the company’s unique circumstances.

In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- For U.S., U.K., Canadian and Australian companies, **oppose** individual directors who serve as members of the nominating committee if the board lacks at least two women and at least two people of color, and if collectively, the board is not at least 40 percent diverse.
- For other non-U.S. companies, **oppose** individual directors who serve as members of the nominating committee if the board lacks at least two women.
- **support** proposals requesting companies to disclose a board diversity and qualifications matrix.
- **support** proposals requesting that companies adopt policies or nominating committee charters to assure that diversity is a key attribute of every director search.

**Board Accountability**

Each director should be willing and able to devote sufficient time and effort to his or her duties as a director. Absent extenuating circumstances, Calvert believes directors who routinely fail to attend board meetings, regardless of the number of boards on which they serve, are not devoting sufficient attention to their corporate governance responsibilities. The board should periodically evaluate its performance, the performance of its various committees, and the performance of individual board members in governing the corporation. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **oppose** slates of directors in situations where the company failed to take action on shareholder proposals that were approved by the majority of votes cast in the prior year.
- **oppose** directors if at the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent opposition (based on shares cast) and the company failed to address the underlying issues that caused the high opposition.
• **oppose** directors if the board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency approved by shareholders, or when required under applicable rules or regulations adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

• **oppose** directors if the board adopts a shareholder rights plan without shareholder approval that exceeds a term of one year without disclosing its rationale for adoption.

• **oppose** directors if the board makes a material adverse change to an existing shareholder rights plan without shareholder approval.

• vote case-by-case and potentially **oppose** director nominees for Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) failures that are judged to be material for long term financial performance.

• **oppose** director candidates who have not attended a sufficient number of meetings of the board or key committees on which they served to effectively discharge their duties as directors unless an acceptable reason for his/her absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing (i.e., medical issues/illness; family engagements).

• **oppose** a director nominees if he or she has unexcused absences from full board or committee meetings that continue for two or more consecutive years, and the individual directors who serve as members of the nominating committee.

• **oppose** directors who sit on more than four public company boards and **oppose** directors who serve as CEO and sit on more than two additional boards.

**Board Committee on Sustainability/Corporate Social Responsibility Issues**

Shareholders have filed proposals seeking the creation of a board committee dedicated to long term strategic thinking and risk management with respect to materials ESG issues affecting the company. While Calvert believes all directors should be informed and active on environmental and social issues, we do see the value of a focused sustainability committee particularly when we believe a company is exhibiting ESG concerns. In voting proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **support** reasonable proposals related to the creation of a board level committee on sustainability/corporate social responsibility issues where the company is demonstrating ESG concerns. In evaluating these proposals, we will consider whether the proposed changes is consistent with good governance practice, would enhance ESG oversight and are appropriate to the unique circumstances of the company.

**Limitations, Director Liability and Indemnification**

Because of increased litigation brought against directors of corporations and the increased costs of director’s liability insurance, many states have passed laws limiting director liability for actions taken in good faith. It is argued that such indemnification is necessary for companies to be able to attract the most qualified individuals to their boards. In voting proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **support** proposals seeking to indemnify directors and limit director liability for acts excluding fraud or other wanton or willful misconduct or illegal acts, but will **oppose** proposals seeking to indemnify directors for all acts.
**Limit Directors’ Tenure**

Corporate directors generally may stand for re-election indefinitely. Opponents of this practice suggest that limited tenure would inject new perspectives into the boardroom as well as possibly creating room for directors from diverse backgrounds. However, continuity is also important and there are other mechanisms such as voting against or withholding votes during the election of directors, which shareholders can use to voice their opposition to certain candidates. It may be in the best interests of the shareholders for long-serving directors to remain on the board, providing they maintain their independence as well as the independent perspective they bring to the board.

In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **vote case-by-case** on proposals to limit director tenure.
- **oppose** incumbent nominating committee board members where average board tenure is 12 years or greater and the company exhibits a record of poor performance (i.e., measured by one, three, and five year total shareholder returns relative to a company’s peers).

**Director Stock Ownership**

Advocates of requirements that directors own shares of company stock argue that stock ownership helps to align the interests of directors with the interests of shareholders. Yet there are ways that such requirements may also undermine effective governance. For example, limiting board service only to those who can afford to purchase shares or encouraging companies to use stock awards as part or all of director compensation. In the latter case, unless there are mandatory holding requirements or other stipulations that help to assure that director and shareholder incentives are indeed aligned, awards of stock as compensation can create conflicts of interest where board members may make decisions for personal gain rather than for the benefit of shareholders. Thus, in some circumstances director stock ownership requirements may be beneficial and in others detrimental to the creation of long-term shareholder value. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **vote case-by-case** on proposals requiring that corporate directors own shares in the company based on factors such as fairness and proportionality.
- **oppose** excessive awards of stock or stock options to directors.
- **vote case-by-case** if a director stock plan exceeds the plan cost or burn rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, proposal on the plan will be voted on taking into consideration the following factors:
  - The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
  - The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
  - Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
  - Equity award vesting schedules;
  - The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
  - Meaningful limits on director compensation;
  - The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
  - The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.
**Director Elections**

**Contested Election of Directors and Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections**

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board or shareholder nominated candidate or slate runs for the purpose of seeking a significant change or improvement in corporate policy, control, and/or structure. Competing slates will be evaluated based upon the personal qualifications of the candidates, the economic impact of the policies that they advance, and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of all shareholders. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- vote **case by case** on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors: (i) long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry; (ii) management’s track record; (iii) background to the contested election; (iv) nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements; (v) strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management; (vi) likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and (vii) stock ownership positions.
- oppose individual director candidates or slates of directors if the board fails to include the necessary breadth and depth of relevant skills, experience and background to ensure adequate oversight of company management.

**Classified or Staggered Boards**

On a classified (or staggered) board, directors are divided into separate classes with directors in each class elected to overlapping three-year terms. Companies argue that such boards offer continuity in strategic direction, which promotes long-term planning. However, in some instances these structures may deter legitimate efforts to elect new directors or takeover attempts that may benefit shareholders. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals to elect all board members annually and to remove classified board structures.

**Majority Vote Standard**

A majority voting standard allows shareholders with a majority of votes in favor or against to determine the election of board nominees. Calvert believes majority voting increases director accountability to shareholders, as directors recognize shareholders have a voice in the election process. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** both advisory and binding proposals seeking to establish a majority vote standard.

**Cumulative Voting**

Cumulative voting allows shareholders to “stack” their votes behind one or a few directors running for the board, thereby helping a minority of shareholders to win board representation. Cumulative voting gives minority shareholders a voice in corporate affairs proportionate to their actual strength in voting shares. However, like many tools, cumulative voting can be misused. In
general, where shareholder rights and voice are well protected by a strong, diverse, and independent board and key committees, where shareholders may call special meetings or act by written consent, and in the absence of strong anti-takeover provisions, cumulative voting is usually unnecessary. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- vote case-by-case on proposals to allow cumulative voting in the election of directors.

**Shareholder Rights**

**Supermajority Vote Requirements**

Supermajority vote requirements in a company's charter or bylaws require a level of voting approval in excess of a simple majority. Generally, supermajority provisions require at least 2/3 affirmative votes for passage of issues. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- oppose supermajority vote requirements.
- support proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.
- support proposals that request the Board to take or initiate the steps necessary to amend the Company's governing documents to provide that all non-binding matters presented by shareholders shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast for and against an item but not abstentions.
- vote case-by-case on proposals submitted by shareholder(s) who own a significant amount of company stock, taking into account: a) ownership structure; b) quorum requirements; and c) supermajority vote requirements.

**Shareholder Access to Proxy**

Equal access proposals ask companies to give shareholders access to proxy materials to state their views on contested issues, including director nominations. In some cases, such proposals allow shareholders holding a certain percentage of shares to nominate directors. We support the view that shareholders should be granted access to the proxy ballot in the nomination of directors under appropriate circumstances. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- support management and shareholder proposals that grant shareholder access to the proxy ballot.
- vote case-by-case on proposals that create threshold targets for shareholder access to the proxy ballot, including an ownership threshold and holding period.

**Restrictions on Shareholders Acting by Written Consent**

Written consent allows shareholders to authorize action outside of a shareholder meeting. It permits action to be taken by the written consent of the same percentage of outstanding shares that would be required to effect the proposed action at a shareholder meeting. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- oppose proposals to restrict, limit or eliminate the right of shareholders to act by written consent.
• **support** proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent.

**Restrictions on Shareholders Calling Meetings**

It is common for company management to retain the right to call special meetings of shareholders at any time, but shareholders often do not have similar rights. In general, we support the right of shareholders to call special meetings, even in extraordinary circumstances, such as consideration of a takeover bid. Restrictions on the right of shareholders to call a meeting can also restrict the ability of shareholders to require company management to consider shareholder proposals or director candidates. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **oppose** restrictions on the right of shareholders to call special meetings.

**Dual or Multiple Classes of Stock**

In order to maintain corporate control in the hands of a certain group of shareholders, companies may seek to create multiple classes of stock with differing rights pertaining to voting and dividends. Creation of multiple classes of stock limits the right of some shareholders – often a majority of shareholders – to exercise influence over the governance of the corporation. This approach in turn may diffuse directors’ incentives to exercise appropriate oversight and control over management. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **oppose** proposals to create dual classes of stock except when a time-based sunset provision exists that would automatically convert the dual-class structure to one-share, one vote on a specified anniversary of the initial public offering.
• vote **case-by-case** on proposals to create classes of stock offering different dividend rights (such as one class that pays cash dividends and a second that pays stock dividends), supporting these proposals if they are consistent with shareholder rights and equitable treatment of all shareholders.
• **support** proposals to recapitalize stock such that each share is equal to one vote.

**Ratification of Auditor and Audit Committee**

While recognizing that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside auditors, we believe that outside auditors must ultimately be accountable to shareholders. Further, Calvert recognizes the critical responsibilities of the audit committee and its members including the oversight of financial statements and internal reporting controls. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **oppose** proposals seeking ratification of the auditor when Calvert determines that the independence of the auditor may be compromised.
• **support** proposals to adopt a policy to ensure that the auditor will only provide audit services to the company and not provide other services.
• **support** proposals that set a reasonable mandatory rotation of the assigned auditor partner (at least every five years).
• **support** proposals that call for more stringent measures to ensure auditor independence.
• **support** proposals (typically outside the US) that call for the annual election of auditors by shareholders.
Audit Committee

- **oppose** members of the audit committee where the audit committee has approved an audit contract where non-audit fees exceed audit fees or in any other case where it appears that the independence of the auditor may be compromised.
- **oppose** members of the audit committee at companies with ineffective internal controls, considering whether the company has a history of accounting issues, or significant recent problems, and the board’s response to them.

In a number of countries outside of the US, companies routinely appoint internal statutory auditors. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** the appointment or reelection of internal statutory auditors unless there are concerns about audit methods used or the audit reports produced, or if there are questions regarding the auditors being voted on.

Transparency and Disclosure

Historically, many non-U.S. countries have not required robust and transparent corporate disclosures equivalent to what is available in the U.S. More recently, there have been waves of reform around the world, including the development of voluntary and required governance codes. The common feature of these codes is that shareholders expect their companies to be transparent. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals that call for full disclosure of company financial performance.
- **support** proposals that call for an annual financial audit by external and independent auditors.
- **support** proposals that call for disclosure of ownership, structure, and objectives of companies, including the rights of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the rights of major shareholders.
- **support** proposals that call for disclosure of corporate governance codes and structures, including efforts to mitigate risk and promote a compliance-oriented corporate culture.
- **support** proposals that call for disclosure of related party transactions.
- **support** proposals that call for disclosure of the board nominating process.

Litigation Rights/Exclusive Venue and Fee Shifting Bylaw Provisions

Bylaw provisions effecting shareholders’ ability to bring suit against the company may include exclusive venue provisions, which provide that the state of incorporation shall be the sole venue for certain types of litigation and fee-shifting provisions that require a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully to pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- vote **case-by-case** on bylaw changes affecting shareholders’ litigation rights.

2. Executive and Employee Compensation

Shareholders have a strong interest in executive pay because compensation creates the incentive structure that drives strategy, risk management and operational excellence. Due
attention to executive compensation is a fiduciary duty of the board, which should exercise care and diligence in the design of compensation plans.

Companies should establish an independent compensation committee to carefully review and set compensation guidelines and develop plans. Compensation plans should be sufficient to attract and retain the best talent, align the interests of management and shareholders, and link pay to financial performance and the achievement of operational goals. Boards should also carefully disclose plan features, amounts of compensation, and linkages between compensation and strategy in clear, plain language. Where appropriate, companies should include quantitative data in either graphical or tabular format in order to aid understanding.

Long-term shareholders should hold boards accountable to this responsibility through active engagement and proxy voting. Shareholders should expect that compensation levels be reasonable relative to peers, company circumstances, and business strategy. They should evaluate whether the plan structure appropriately links pay to performance and is consistent with principles of pay equity for other members of leadership and for ordinary workers. The structure of pay plans should also incorporate management incentives to deal fairly with all stakeholders and implement a long-term, sustainable business strategy. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

**Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay)**

- support the right of shareholders to cast an annual, non-binding vote on corporate executive compensation plans.
- vote case-by-case on “say-on-pay” proposals by company management, generally considering the following criteria:

**Incentive Compensation**

- **Pay for Performance**: The structure and level of pay should be linked to performance in a manner that aligns management interests with those of shareholders over a full business cycle. Named Executive Officers (NEOs) should be reasonably rewarded for success and should share losses with shareholders during downturns. Plans should incentivize a reasonable amount of risk taking, consistent with the interests of long term shareholders. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:
  - oppose provisions that reduce the alignment of management and shareholder interests,
  - oppose plans that do not clearly explain the reason for any significant deviation from a clear link between pay and performance.

- **Time Horizon**: NEOs should be given a mix of short and long-term incentives including both cash and equity-based securities, with the greater weight to long-term awards. Vesting of long-term awards should be consistent with the business cycle of the company, normally within at least a 3-5 year time horizon. Companies should explain why the time horizon chosen is consistent with business strategy. At least a portion of equity compensation should be required to be held for a period that seeks to align NEOs with long-term owners.

- **Incentive Criteria**: Long-term awards (whether restricted stock, options, performance shares or other structure) should be both time and performance based, with a
transparent mix of quantitative and qualitative criteria determining awards, as appropriate. The company should explain how incentives link to corporate strategy and drive long-term performance and risk management. Performance targets should be realistic and appropriately challenging. Some discretion to allow boards to adjust compensation to unforeseen circumstances may be appropriate. However, excessive discretion raises concerns, especially when performance is poor or when pay does not reflect performance.

- **Peers:** Peer group companies should be chosen based on reasonable criteria, such as size, industry or risk profile, and the rationale disclosed to shareholders. The Board should make a careful analysis of how plans compare to peer groups and explain significant deviations based on the unique circumstances of the company.

- **Pay Equity:** The level of CEO pay relative to other categories of employment should be reasonable, considering both the balance of compensation among top management as well as the ratio of CEO pay to that of ordinary workers. Pay that is excessively unequal relative to peer companies may raise a concern about the independence of the board from management influence, unless adequately explained. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:
  - oppose mandated pay limits as a check on pay disparity.

- **Stakeholders and Sustainability:** We prefer that the plan incorporate strategic goals related to sustainability and fair treatment of stakeholders. The company should disclose which sustainability or stakeholder issues are material to performance and how compensation plans create incentives for optimal management of these issues.

- **Clawbacks:** Calvert expects that plans include a provision to recoup compensation in the case of malfeasance or material accounting restatement.

- **Perquisites:** Perquisites are non-financial forms of compensation such as country club memberships or personal travel on company aircraft. The cash value of perquisites are usually small relative to the size of pay packages and may be appropriate if linked to business needs. However, excessive perquisites may raise concerns about the independence of the board from management. Executive perquisites, and their rationale, should be clearly disclosed along with other compensation.

- **Transparency:** Plan provisions and pay levels should be clearly disclosed in plain language for each named executive officer. The structure of plans, pay levels, and rationales for compensation decisions should also be made clear. The plan should be clear regarding the link between pay, long-term strategy, and performance expectations.

- **Ethics:** In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:
  - oppose plans submitted by companies with a recent history of ethical lapses related to compensation (e.g. backdating of options, inaccurate disclosures) unless the company has made significant governance changes to ensure that compensation is managed using the highest ethical standards.
**Equity Compensation**

Equity compensation may include restricted shares, options, or other structures designed to link pay to equity performance. All equity plans are subject to the incentive criteria detailed above. Additionally, we believe that companies should not make loans to support stock purchases. While these Guidelines generally oppose plans with certain features, Calvert may support any well-designed provision in specific circumstances where it is warranted, if appropriate restrictions are in place, the rationale clearly and persuasively disclosed, and the provision is submitted to shareholders for approval. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **oppose** provisions that provide downside protection to plan participants that are not available to other shareholders;
- **support** equity plans that tend to create long term incentives for management to create long-term sustainable value. The board should carefully consider how the mix of equity linked securities aligns management incentives with reasonable tolerance for risk consistent with business strategy.
- **Support** proposals that will require executives to hold sufficient shares to incentivize them to think like long term owners.

**Pay Disparity:** **oppose** equity plans that whose benefits are inappropriately skewed toward top management, in a manner inconsistent with the goal of attracting and motivating professionals at all levels of the corporation.

**Reload Options and Evergreen Provisions:** **oppose** features, such as evergreen provisions and reload options that may lead to a misalignment of management and shareholder interests.

**Repricing:** **oppose** the repricing of options, which undermines the incentive value of these awards.

**Accelerated Vesting:** **oppose** accelerated vesting of shares and options in the case of a restructuring.

**Dilution:** **oppose** plans that are excessively dilutive to minority shareholders.

**Hedging:** **oppose** provisions supporting hedging of risks by NEOs in a manner that undermines the design of compensation plans.

**Employee Stock Purchase Plans**

- **support** broad-based employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs), which encourage alignment between employees and shareholders.
- **oppose ESPPs that are determined to be unreasonable because, for instance, they offer shares for less than 85% of the current price or create dilution of greater than 10%.”

**Severance Agreements (“Golden Parachutes”)**

Companies may establish severance agreements that provide compensation packages for top executives who are terminated or demoted pursuant to a takeover or other change in control
Companies argue that such agreements are necessary to keep executives from "jumping ship" during potential takeover attempts. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act provides shareholders with advisory votes on "golden parachute" arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs). Special focus is placed on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain tax liabilities of executives. Calvert believes boards should allow shareholders the ability to ratify such severance or change in control agreements to determine if such awards are excessive and unnecessary. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals providing shareholders the right to ratify adoption of severance or change in control agreements.
- **oppose** the election of compensation committee members who approve severance agreements that are not ratified by shareholders.
- **oppose** golden parachute proposals that include one or more of the following features, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):
  - Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
  - Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;
  - Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;
  - Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;
  - Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);
  - Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;
  - Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or
  - Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or
  - The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

**Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors**

- **vote case-by-case** on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:
  - The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;
  - The company's three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and
  - The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

**Non-Employee Director Pay – U.S.**

- **oppose** members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e., two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling reason or other mitigating factors.
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Program

- vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking U.S. ratification of non-employee director compensation based on:
- If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and
- An assessment of the following factors:
  - The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
  - The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
  - Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
  - Equity award vesting schedules;
  - The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
  - Meaningful limits on director compensation;
  - The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
  - The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Compensation Committee

- oppose members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board when it is determined they have approved compensation plans that are deemed excessive or have not amended their policies in response to shareholder concern.

3. Mergers, Acquisitions, Spin-offs, and Other Corporate Restructuring

Mergers, acquisitions and other corporate restructurings frequently raise significant issues and should be considered very carefully. These actions may have the effect of profoundly changing corporate governance and strategy.

Considering the Non-Financial Effects of a Merger Proposal

Mergers, acquisitions and other corporate restructuring proposals allow or require the board to consider the impact of the proposed action on various stakeholders, including employees, communities of place or interest, customers, and business partners, and give the board the right to reject a proposal on the grounds that it would adversely affect the company's stakeholders.

In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- support proposals that consider non-financial impacts of mergers, acquisitions or other corporate restructurings.
- vote case-by-case on all merger, acquisition and restructuring proposals, giving consideration to the value being offered to shareholders and the likely impact on environmental, social and governance concerns.
- oppose proposals for corporate acquisition, takeover, restructuring plans that include significant new takeover defenses or that pose other potential financial, social, or environmental risks or liabilities.

Opt-Out of State Anti-takeover Law

Several states have enacted anti-takeover statutes to protect companies against hostile takeovers. In some, directors or shareholders are required to opt in for such provisions to be
Hostile takeovers come in many forms. Some offer advantages to shareholders by replacing current management with more effective management. Others do not. Shareholders of both the acquirer and the target firms stand to lose or gain significantly, depending on the terms of the takeover, the strategic attributes of the takeover, and the price and method of acquisition. In general, shareholders should have the right to consider all potential takeovers, hostile or not, and vote their shares based on their assessment of the particular offer. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals for bylaw changes allowing a company to opt out of state anti-takeover laws.
- **oppose** proposals requiring companies to opt into state anti-takeover statutes.

**Unilateral Charter, Bylaws and Amendments**

Boards should not be allowed to make bylaw/charter amendments changes that adversely affect shareholder rights without seeking shareholder ratification of the amendments. This policy codifies our current approach to unilateral bylaw/charter amendments and the issue of companies adopting a suite of shareholder-unfriendly governance provisions shortly before, or on the date of, their initial public offerings ("IPOs"). The policy addresses this trend in IPO-related amendments by considering it a factor when determining a vote recommendation on directors. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **oppose** or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who will be considered on a case-by-case basis) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders' rights or that could adversely affect shareholders.
- **vote case-by-case** on proposals to amend or change corporate charter or by-laws, and will ordinarily **support** such proposals if they are deemed consistent with shareholders' best interests and the principles of sound governance and overall corporate social responsibility/sustainability.

**Reincorporation**

Corporations are bound by the laws of the states in which they are incorporated. Companies reincorporate for a variety of reasons, including shifting incorporation to a state where the company has its most active operations or corporate headquarters. In other cases, reincorporation is to take advantage of stronger state corporate takeover laws, or to reduce tax or regulatory burdens. In these instances, reincorporation may result in greater costs to stakeholders, or in loss of valuable shareholder rights. Finally, changes in state law have made reincorporating in certain locations more or less favorable to governance issues such as shareholder rights. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals to reincorporate for valid business reasons (such as reincorporating in the same state as the corporate headquarters).
- **vote case-by-case** on proposals to reincorporate for improvements in governance structure and policies (such as reincorporating in states like North Dakota, with shareholder friendly provisions).
• **oppose** proposals to reincorporate outside the United States if is determined that such reincorporation is no more than the establishment of a skeleton offshore headquarters or mailing address for purposes of tax avoidance, and the company does not have substantial business activities in the country in which it proposes to reincorporate.

**Common Stock Authorization**

Companies may choose to increase their authorization of common stock for a variety of reasons. In some instances, the intended purpose of the increased authorization may clearly benefit shareholders; in others, the benefits to shareholders are less clear. Given that increased authorization of common stock is dilutive, except where the authorization is being used to facilitate a stock split or stock dividend, proposed increases in authorized common stock must be examined carefully to determine whether the benefits of issuing additional stock outweigh the potential dilution. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **support** proposals authorizing the issuance of additional common stock necessary to facilitate a stock split.
• **vote case-by-case** on proposals authorizing the issuance of additional common stock.
• **oppose** the proposals if the company already has a large amount of stock authorized but not issued, or reserved for its stock option plans, or where the proposal is to increase shares by more than 100 percent of the current authorization (unless there is a convincing business plan for use of additional authorized common stock) due to concerns that the authorized but unissued shares will be used as a shareholder rights plan or other takeover defense.
• **support** proposals to implement a reverse stock split when the number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced.
• **vote case-by-case** on proposals related to reverse stock splits that do not result in a proportionate reduction in the number of authorized shares, taking into account the following factors:
  o a Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;
  o Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;
  o the company's rationale; or
  o Other factors, as applicable.

**Blank Check Preferred Stock**

Blank check preferred stock is stock with a fixed dividend and a preferential claim on company assets relative to common shares, for which the terms of the stock (voting, dividend, and conversion rights) are set by the board at a future date without further shareholder action. While such an issue can in theory have legitimate corporate purposes, most often it has been used as an anti-takeover device. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **oppose** the creation of blank check preferred stock.
• **oppose** increases in authorization of preferred stock with unspecified terms and conditions of use that may be determined by the board at a future date, without approval of shareholders.
Shareholder Rights Plans

Shareholder rights plans (sometimes referred to as “poison pills”) are triggered by an unwanted takeover attempt and cause a variety of events to occur which may make the company financially less attractive to the suitor. Typically, directors have enacted these plans without shareholder approval. Most shareholder rights plans resolutions deal with shareholder ratification of the shareholder rights plans or repealing them altogether. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals calling for shareholder approval of shareholder rights plans.
- **oppose** shareholder rights plans.

Greenmail

Greenmail is the premium a takeover target firm offers to a corporate raider in exchange for the raider’s shares. This usually means that the bidder's shares are purchased at a price higher than market price, discriminating against other shareholders. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** anti-greenmail provisions.
- **oppose** the payment of greenmail.

B. CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. Sustainability Reporting

Investors require substantive and comparable information about corporate ESG performance both to integrate these factors into investment decisions and to engage with companies. A high quality sustainability report can demonstrate the company’s positioning with respect to the material ESG risks and opportunities it may face. However, sustainability reporting is a relatively new form of corporate disclosure, and until recently most sustainability reports offered little of value to investors, and a high degree variation in quality and relevance persists among corporate disclosures. Sustainability reporting continues to improve as guidelines promulgated by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) have become recognized standards for disclosure. These standards are useful to companies seeking to align their disclosures with the needs of the capital markets, but compliance with a third-party is not a substitute for accurately describing the company’s unique circumstances. Effective reports provide clarity about a company’s understanding of the risks and opportunities arising from its relationships with stakeholders; its governance policies for addressing these issues; and robust performance data that informs shareholders of how the company measures itself against its objectives. We believe that sustainability information that is deemed material should be incorporated into a company’s regulatory filings. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals asking companies to prepare sustainability reports, including those requesting disclosure consistent with SASB, GRI, or other internationally recognized sets of guidelines.
- **support** proposals requesting that companies conduct social and/or environmental audits and/or risk assessments of their performance.
2. Environment

All economic activities affect, and in turn depend on, the natural environment. Physical changes in ecosystems, the associated effects on human health and the availability of natural resources, and national and international efforts to mitigate environmental harm will have a profound impact on corporate and investor outcomes. We believe that, over time, the market will reward companies whose strategies and operations continually progress towards minimal negative or beneficial environmental impact. As investors, we also believe that over the long-term stable ecosystems are necessary to sustain capital markets and economic growth.

We expect that companies will develop robust environmental management systems; implement business strategies that anticipate risks and opportunities related to growing expectations for corporate environmental sustainability, and set quantitative targets for reducing environmental impacts from operations and supply chains. Companies should pay particular attention to their impact on:

*Climate:* Companies should develop policies and procedures to anticipate the risks and opportunities related to the transition to a low carbon economy; reduce greenhouse gas emissions from products, operations and supply chains; make use of renewable and low carbon energy sources where possible; mitigate ocean acidification; and anticipate possible physical impacts of climate change on markets and infrastructure. Companies should consider all material sources of climate impacts, including direct emissions, indirect emissions through purchased electricity, products, supply chains, end-of-life and ancillary business activities.

*Water:* Companies should analyze risks associated with business operations that might affect: water stressed areas; the possible impacts of changing water systems on their ability to operate; the impact of company operations on water quality or availability; consider the company’s impacts on marine life and ecosystems; and explore ways of increasing access to water, especially among economically disadvantaged populations. Companies in water-intensive industries, including the food products, paper and semiconductor industries, should consider improving their water efficiency or water re-use.

*Toxins and Pollution:* Companies should develop policies and procedures to reduce or eliminate the use and marketing of toxic chemicals; to minimize waste throughout product lifecycles; and to seek alternatives to products and operations whose emissions harm human health and the environment. Additionally, producers of plastics should report on its efforts to reduce or eliminate the use and marketing of plastics, as well as the relevant impact on its business model.

*Land Use and Biodiversity:* Companies should analyze the impacts of their operations and products on land use and biodiversity, including agricultural land use, deforestation, habitat conservation, and pollution.

In voting on proposals relating to the foregoing environmental matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

**General**

- **support** reasonable proposals to reduce negative environmental impacts and a company’s overall environmental footprint, including any threats to biodiversity in ecologically sensitive areas.
support proposals asking companies to report on their environmental practices, policies and impacts, including environmental damage and health risks resulting from operations, and the impact of environmental liabilities on shareholder value.

**Climate Change Mitigation**

- support proposals requesting that companies disclose information on greenhouse gas emissions (including carbon, methane, and all other recognized greenhouse gases) and mitigation targets.
- support proposals asking companies to adopt greenhouse gas reduction targets, including science based targets.
- support proposals asking for the preparation of a report on a company’s efforts to increase its use of renewable energy sources.
- support proposals asking for increased investment in renewable energy unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive.
- support proposals seeking an assessment of a company’s impact on financed emissions through their investment, lending, and borrowing activities.
- support proposals asking companies to report on the strategic implications of a current or anticipated energy transformation on their business models.

**Climate Change Adaptation**

- support proposals seeking the preparation of a report on the company’s risks attributable to climate change.
- support proposals seeking disclosure of the company’s plans to adapt to climate change.

**Waste and Pollution**

- support proposals seeking improved management and reporting of a company’s risks linked to pollution of air, water, land or other ecological systems.
- support proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to the lifecycle environmental impact of materials used in its production and products, including plastics.
- support proposals asking for reporting and management of waste throughout the supply chain and product lifecycle, including proposals to develop and report on recycling and “circular economy” strategies.
- support proposals asking for a report on the health effects of environmental pollution, especially with respect to the disparate impact of pollution on different ethnic and socioeconomic groups.

**Water**

- support proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use or impacts to water, including but not limited to the company’s impact on water quality, availability, and accessibility.
- support proposals seeking the adoption of programs and policies that enhance equitable access to affordable safe drinking water and sanitation.
- support proposals seeking improved management of water in industrial or agricultural operations and supply chains.
• **support** proposals asking for improved management and reporting of marine ecosystems.

• **support** proposals seeking improvements in water efficiency or water re-use for companies in water-intensive industries, including the food products, paper and semiconductor industries.

**Land-Use Change / Biodiversity Conservation**

• **support** proposals requesting greater transparency of the company’s impact on land use, including deforestation, throughout the company’s product lifecycle.

• **support** proposals asking companies for the preparation of a report on the impact of the company on biodiversity, throughout the company’s product lifecycle.

**3. Workplace Issues**

**Labor Relations and Vendor Standards**

The relationship between companies and their labor forces has become more complex over the last 20-30 years. The simple employee-employer relationship has evolved into outsourced and offshored supply chains, contingent workers, contractors, “gig economy” labor, and other non-standard forms. Companies retain the responsibility for respecting the human rights of everyone they employ regardless of the legal status of the worker. Companies that provide fair labor standards, equitable compensation and decent working conditions may experience improved productivity and worker engagement. Conversely, companies that violate core human rights may face legal and reputational risk, as well as the risk of a disengaged and unproductive workforce.

Worker rights include, at a minimum, the core International Labor Organization standards, which include freedom of association and collective bargaining, freedom from discrimination, and prohibitions on child and forced labor. Other safeguards, such as the right to a safe and healthy workplace, freedom from harassment and livable and equitable compensation, are also important.

At a minimum, companies should develop a code of conduct that respects all relevant human rights in the workplace and that covers company operations, supply chains and other key business partners. Companies should report on their human capital practices as well as their related policies and procedures. Companies should also provide detailed explanations of expectations to managers and vendors and provide for independent monitoring of compliance. Remediation should be available for violations of company policy, and the company should be transparent about when it would terminate a relationship based on human rights violations.

**Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)**

While most companies now agree that a diverse workforce is important to corporate performance, progress towards equality remains slow, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Insufficient representation deprives the companies of the perspectives and talents of individuals who are prevented from achieving their full potential.

Over the past few years, investor concerns about diversity have broadened from the number of women and people of color in leadership to root causes of persistent barriers to advancement,
such as racial or gender gaps in pay, sexual harassment and gender-based violence, and the absence of effective policies to help employees balance work and family responsibilities.

Many investors are asking companies to develop diversity policies that outline company efforts to prevent discrimination and build a more diverse workforce; to explain the company’s policies to increase diversity on its board of directors; disclose the company’s diversity statistics for each professional level, for example through release of the EEO-1 report in the United States; to provide quantitative and qualitative reports on pay gaps; and to provide appropriate disclosures on company efforts to eliminate harassment and other forms of gender-based violence in the workplace.

Additionally, investors are asking companies to develop policies and practices to prevent discrimination and harassment of LGBT employees and to create a working environment where individuals can feel comfortable and accepted. While most U.S. public companies currently have a non-discrimination policies, investors are concerned that these policies are consistently applied across the company, its supply chain and its business partners, especially in places that do not provide legal protections for LGBT people.

In voting on proposals relating to workplace matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals requesting that companies adopt fair labor practices consistent with all recognized international human rights standards.
- **support** proposals requesting that companies adopt codes of conduct and other vendor/supplier standards requiring that suppliers, licensees, and other key business partners comply with all applicable laws and/or international standards regarding wages, benefits, and working conditions.
- **support** proposals requesting companies to adopt, report on, and agree to compliance and enforcement procedures for labor and human rights codes of conduct, including independent monitoring.
- **support** proposals asking for an assessment of risks related to potential violations of labor and human rights.
- **support** proposals asking a company to issue a diversity report, including diversity policies and full disclosure of EEO-1 data for U.S. workforces.
- **support** proposals asking companies to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination based on sexual orientation, and gender identity and/or expression, and to report on company initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and/or expression.
- **support** proposals to adopt policies to eliminate gender-based violence and other forms of harassment from the workplace, as well as proposals asking a company to prepare a report on its efforts to promote a safe workplace for all employees.
- **support** proposals asking companies to prepare a report on pay equity based on race, gender, or other appropriate category.
- Calvert will **oppose** proposals that seek to eliminate or scale back diversity or non-discrimination policies.
4. International Operations and Human Rights

Business Activities and Investments

Global corporations often do business in countries lacking adequate legal or regulatory structures protecting workers, consumers, communities and the environment, or where lax enforcement renders existing laws ineffective. Companies operate in these locations for a variety of reasons, including access to natural resources, lower wages or regulatory burdens, access to regional markets, or for many other reasons. For the global economic actors, globalized companies create numerous benefits including expanded markets, improved efficiencies, and greater competitiveness. These operations may also be highly beneficial to the host country by providing jobs, tax payments, access to new products and services, and development opportunities. However, such operations may exploit local workforces or communities, or become complicit in human rights violations committed by host governments or business partners, if companies fail to develop and enforce substantive policies to respect human rights.

Modern communications technologies have increased public scrutiny of company operations around the world. Adverse publicity from transgressions of human rights may result in regulatory action, loss of social license to operate, boycotts, work stoppages and other business harms. Policies to safeguard human rights help to insure company’s ability to operate globally with a minimum of opposition from global or local stakeholders.

Numerous internationally recognized standards guide the development of corporate human rights policies. At a minimum, companies should commit to respecting all human rights as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Company policy should also be consistent with internationally recognized standards for corporations, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Global Compact.

It is particularly important for companies whose operations may have a significant impact on indigenous communities to develop affirmative policies and practices respect the rights of these groups both in the North America and globally. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples defines the scope of rights specific to these groups, including for example self-determination, freedom from discrimination, and knowledge, cultures and traditional practices. Companies should develop policies to avoid complicity in violations of indigenous rights through business partnerships, supply chains or financial investments. Projects and investments should proceed only with the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous communities that may be significantly impacted.

Where relevant, companies should also develop specific policies to ensure respect for human rights that are material for their business, such as the right to health care and the right to privacy. Companies should also incorporate a global policy to ensure respect for the rights of LGBT people, especially in countries and localities whose policies are either hostile or neglectful of LGBT rights. Numerous guidelines also exist that are relevant for specific industries and types of operations. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:
• **support** proposals requesting that companies develop appropriate policies to ensure respect for human rights throughout their global operations, including business partners and supply chains.

• **support** proposals requesting that a company undertake due diligence appropriate to their industry and issues specific to their human rights risks.

• **support** proposals requesting that companies develop policies and protocols to eliminate bribery and corruption.

• **support** proposals asking companies to respect the rights of local and indigenous communities to participate in decisions affecting their local environment, consistent with international law regarding the rights of indigenous people to free prior and informed consent.

5. **Product Safety and Impact**

Companies bear primary responsibility for the safety of their operations and products. In certain circumstances, ignoring product safety or impact concerns may result in short-term profitability for companies. However, investors in companies that harm their customers or other stakeholders may be concerned about a risk of a consumer or regulatory response that undermines the economic viability of companies. Moreover, harmful products may have broader community or environmental impacts that may de-stabilize markets in which shareholders invest. Calvert believes companies should develop governance and reporting mechanisms to ensure the safety of their products. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **case-by-case** on proposals asking companies to disclose product ingredients, depending on the feasibility of disclosure and the nature of the safety concerns.

• **support** proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives.

**Toxic Chemicals**

Greater awareness of the impact of toxic chemicals on human health has led to the widespread regulatory limitations on these chemicals and consumer embrace of alternatives. Companies who ignore these trends and defend the use of chemicals deemed harmful risk being overtaken by more innovative rivals in the marketplace. Calvert believes companies should disclose policies and practices to reduce the use or marketing of toxic chemicals, and provide reasonable disclosures of performance. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **support** resolutions asking companies to disclose policies related to toxic chemicals.

• **support** proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing or substituting safer alternatives for all harmful ingredients used in company products.

**Animal Welfare**

Concern for animal welfare has led to a consumer movement to demand better treatment of food animals. Calvert believes companies should develop reasonable policies to assure the well-being of kept animals, consistent with good environmental practices and the safety and quality of foods. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:
• **support** proposals asking management to report on steps to reduce or eliminate antibiotic use for animal health.
• **support** proposals requesting that companies report on policies to ensure animal welfare.
• **vote case-by-case** on proposals asking companies to limit animal testing, giving consideration to the specific practices raising concerns, potential benefits to human health and welfare, and available alternative processes.

**Inherently Dangerous Products and Inherently Hazardous Activities**

Some products are inherently dangerous by nature because their function involves a risk of danger or injury to consumers or the general public’s health and safety. Additionally, some activities are inherently hazardous by nature, that is, they hold substantial risks of predatory practices and/or may lead to addiction. Inherently dangerous products, which may be age-restricted or require a license to obtain, include, but are not limited to, alcohol, tobacco, e-cigarettes, guns, firearms, and other weapons. Inherently hazardous activities include, but are not limited to, gambling and non-medicinal cannabis consumption.

Companies should publicly disclose the inherent risks associated with these products and activities and develop reasonable policies and procedures to mitigate the risks associated with their manufacturing, sale, distribution, use and/or participation. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

• **support** proposals asking management to report on steps taken to mitigate the risks associated with consumer use of inherently dangerous products and consumer participation in inherently hazardous activities.
• **support** proposals requesting that companies report on its policies and procedures related to the risks associated with the manufacturing, sale and distribution of inherently dangerous products and participation in inherently hazardous activities.
• **vote case-by-case** on proposals asking companies to stop manufacturing inherently dangerous products or participating in inherently hazardous activities.

**Data Privacy and Data Security**

A revolution in computer and communications technologies has led to the rapid development of previously unimagined new services and access to information, while the number of internet users continues to expand globally. One result of the transformation of communications services is the exponential growth in the personal information that has been created and collected by companies. This data has potentially beneficial uses, including contributing to improved healthcare, more efficient transportation, and greater access to financial services. However, many people may have concerns about giving companies access to their personal data, particularly if unauthorized users gain access to this data for criminal or other malicious purposes.

Beyond concerns about the **security** of data, users may also be concerned about data **privacy** -- the lawful use of these data by companies for purposes other than what users intend. For example, data could be used to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, health or family status, or for other inappropriate purpose; for economic exploitation or harassment; or to
manipulate a democratic election. These concerns are heightened when companies sell data to third parties with no connection to the original user.

For this reason, governments are currently questioning the appropriate use of data, and in particular whether users or companies own the data that is collected. Rules requiring companies to gain user consent for use of their data are coming into effect, but their effectiveness is not yet proven.

For example, the “right to be forgotten” has been codified in the European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation. Under such, personal data must be erased immediately where: (1) the data is no longer needed for its original processing purpose; (2) the data subject has withdrawn his or her consent and there is no other legal ground for processing; (3) the data subject has objected and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing; or (4) erasure is required to fulfill a statutory obligation under the EU law. In addition, data must naturally be erased if the processing itself was against the law in the first place.

Expanding use of media raises additional concerns, such as the company’s responsibility to set rules for appropriate conduct on social media; the addictiveness of internet services, especially to children; and the company’s relationship to foreign governments who may wish to use data to violate human rights, especially the right to free expression.

For investors in companies whose business models depend upon unfettered access and use of user data, there is a risk that society will expand privacy rights and limit corporate use of personal data for business purposes, or that users will find ways of masking this information from companies while using internet services. Companies should analyze these risks and create governance structures that will allow them to adapt to changing expectations for data privacy and security. Companies should also develop robust systems to safeguard data from unauthorized access and use. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support data security** proposals asking companies to strengthen governance mechanisms to prevent illegal or non-consensual use of data, and proposals for greater transparency regarding company efforts to protect user data.
- **support reasonable data privacy** proposals asking companies to set reasonable standards for the fair collection, storage and use of consumer data, respecting the rights of users to offer fully informed consent for the use of their data.
- **support reasonable proposals asking companies to adopt content management policies** that ensure freedom of expression and the free flow of information balanced with respect for user security, privacy, freedom from harassment and other rights online.
- **support** proposals asking companies to develop policies to ensure that the company respects human rights wherever its services are available.
- **support proposals asking companies to analyze the risk to its business model relating to data privacy or security.**

**Health and Pharmaceuticals**

The continued high cost of medications in the United States limits access to many people, especially those lacking health insurance. In the developing world, lack of access to healthcare continues to be a barrier to the advancement of these societies. Additionally, the emergence of
an epidemic of opioid abuse has raised concerns about the marketing practices of the pharmaceutical industry. Investors may be concerned about a public backlash against pharmaceutical company policies, with potential risks to the company’s ability to gain regulatory approval for new products, protect its intellectual property rights, and gain access to markets internationally, as well as potential liabilities relating to harm caused by its products. Calvert believes companies should clearly disclose how its governance and management systems ensure attention to long-term risks relating to pricing and marketing strategies. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- support proposals asking pharmaceutical companies to take steps to make drugs more affordable and accessible globally, to report on its efforts to increase access, and to align governance mechanisms with the objective of increasing access, consistent with long term financial performance.
- support proposals requesting that companies prepare a report on their policies to ensure that drug price increases do not have the effect of reducing access to life-saving medicines.
- support proposals to report on efforts to align governance mechanisms with high standards for product safety, especially regarding opioids.
- support proposals asking for responsible management of the production lifecycle of pharmaceutical products, including safe disposal.
- support proposals asking for information about the nutritional composition of the company’s food products.

6. Consumer Finance

Predatory Finance

Predatory finance is the imposition of unfair, abusive or deceptive practices on consumers of financial products. Targets of predatory practices are often economically disadvantaged people but may also be military families, students or the elderly. Of particular concern are practices that catch consumers in a “debt trap” in which additional loans are necessary to pay back original loans because the borrower is unable to repay their debts. Predatory practices may be profitable in the short-term, but may impose longer term risks to shareholders both because of the risks that the company’s will face regulatory scrutiny or consumer backlash and because predatory finance has the effect of de-stabilizing the market as a whole. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- support proposals calling on companies to address and eliminate predatory or racially discriminatory lending practices.
- support proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.

7. Political Action Committees and Political Partisanship

Shareholders may be concerned that for some companies, activities to influence the political or policy environment may not be consistent with company ESG guidelines or the long term interests of shareholders. While federal and state law require disclosure of direct political spending, companies may make undisclosed expenditures indirectly through organizations who are not required to reveal their funding sources. For this reason, shareholders are unable to track corporate political spending unless the company voluntarily discloses this information.
We believe that a lack of transparency regarding political contributions creates a risk that decisions about expenditures will be driven by the personal interest of management or positions that may produce short-term gains at the expense of the company’s values or the long-term interests of shareholders. To determine whether corporate political and lobbying activities are appropriate, shareholders require complete reporting of expenditures on these activities, as well as explanations of how decisions are made. In voting on proposals relating to these matters, Calvert ordinarily will:

- **support** proposals asking companies to disclose political spending made either directly or through political action committees, trade associations and/or other advocacy associations.
- **support** proposals asking companies to disclose the budgets dedicated to public policy lobbying activities.
- **support** proposals requesting a report discussing the alignment between a company’s political contributions and its sustainability commitments and public policy positions.
- **support** proposals requesting that companies support public policy activities, including lobbying or political spending that are consistent with shareholder or other stakeholder efforts to strengthen policies that protect workers, communities, the environment, public safety, or any of the other financially material issues.

8. **Other Issues**

In the event Calvert is required to vote on a proposal that is not addressed by the general principles and voting guidelines expressed herein, it generally expects to determine the manner in which to vote such proposal in alignment with the objectives of promoting long-term corporate health and sustainable financial, social and environmental performance.